Introduction
India passed the Patent (Amendment) Act of 2005 to bring its patent laws in line with the trade-related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement's agenda of extending international intellectual property protection to patent right holders, who were mostly from developed countries. India through the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement was constrained to give up on its process patent regime, which was originally introduced in 1970 to develop its generic drug manufacturing market and to create better access to medicines. The introduction of the new patent laws witnesses a radical shift in Indian policies on pharmaceutical and chemical patenting. Taking the TRIPS compliance exercise as an opportunity, India has firmed up on its compulsory licensing laws, introduced direct provisions on 'exhaustion of patent rights,' 'pre-grant' and 'post-grant' opposition, and has most importantly introduced provisions to check the practice of evergreening. It can be argued that the patent law regime introduced in India demonstrates how developing countries can utilize the TRIPS flexibilities to introduce laws to suit the requirements of its own health care policies.
The decision to change the patent laws gains in importance, as India is one of the fastest growing pharmaceutical markets, with some writers referring to it as the 'pharmacy of the developing world. ' The jurisprudence from the courts on the Amended Act of 2005 is still nascent; but one can still infer, from the decisions of Indian courts and quasi-judicial authorities, the strong stance taken by India on patent evergreening, the use of pre-grant and post-grant opposition, and compulsory licensing. Although there is clear judicial precedent, emerging from developed countries like the USA and UK where evergreening is scorned upon, it is India that has taken the first step in introducing legislative measures to check the practice of evergreening. A combined reading of the amended laws, the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the recent judicial and quasi-judicial renderings from India present an interesting area for study. They seem to suggest that developing countries can operate the TRIPS flexibility to deal with national emergencies, as access to patented medicines become unaffordable and reliance is more on generic medicines.
Indian patent laws
Indian patent laws are steeped in its colonial past, as it was under British rule for close to 200 years, between 1757 and 1947. 1 This period saw the introduction of the common law in India, and importantly the first legislation on patent rights in 1856, which was primarily designed to serve the interest of British patent holders. It is safe to assume that any legislative attempts to codify a practice of granting patents began in India only during the British rule and in particular from the nineteenth century. 2 The Indian patent laws can be broadly categorized under two heads, namely 'pre-independent India' and 'post-independent India.' 3 The legislative history of pre-independent India's patent laws is well chronicled, 4 and the current study will focus on patent laws passed in India from the post-independent period, leading up to its amendment in 2005.
Post-independence
At the time of independence from British rule, India was predominantly an agrarian society, with over two-thirds of its population living in rural areas. Access to medicines was scarce, and much limited to the affluent, due to a lack of indigenous production of drugs, 5 and for 1 India was under the British East India Company Rule from 1757 until the transfer of power to the British Crown in 1858, and later Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India in 1876. The British rule, referred to as 'British Raj' came to an end in August 1947. The region referred to as 'British India' also included the modern day states of India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and other countries. 2 Legislative attempts began with the first legislation under British rule on the subject, and the Indian Patent Act was passed in 1856. Roundabout the same time, power was completely transferred to the Crown from the British East India Company. 3 The modern history of Indian patent laws can be brought within three categories, namely pre-legislation period, the period of exclusive privileges and the period of patents. committee, a bill was tabled before lower house of the parliament, which was to lapse due to the dissolution of the lower house. 15 
Justice Ayyangar Committee
In 1957, a decade after independence, the Government of India appointed yet another committee, headed by Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, to review the adequacy of the Indian patent system. This committee known as Justice Ayyangar Committee presented its report in September 1959. 16 The report was in two parts, with the first part dealing in general aspects of patent laws and containing recommendations, and the second part presenting comments on the lapsed bill of 1953 and suggesting improvements. 17 Some of the views expressed by this committee on how food patenting and pharmaceutical inventions can affect accessibility to medicines, and on compulsory licensing continued to form part of the debates before the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the run up to the signing of the TRIPS Agreement. 18 The Ayyangar Committee's report which is seen as being central to the creation of patent laws in post-independent India, recommended that India deviate from the patent policies of industrialized countries, 19 and proposed radical changes to the then existing Indian patent laws. 20 The committee observed that the high cost of drugs in post-independent India resulted directly from the monopoly exercised by foreign-based pharmaceutical companies over drug production in India. It was of the view that food and medicines, which are important in daily life and vital for the health and well being of the community, should be made available to the public at a reasonable price, and hence strongly recommended against the granting of product patents for food and medicines. 21 The rationale behind the recommendation for a process patent regime stemmed from the premise that the recognition of the 'process of production' would accelerate research in developing alternative processes, leading to increased diversity of products at competitive prices. 22 For the purposes of industrial advancement the Ayyangar Committee favoured the 'process' rather than 'product' The TRIPS Council's task was to enable local industrialization in least developed nations, and the Ayyangar Committee Report which also advocated self-reliance can be seen as a useful resource in that pursuit. 19 Ibid. protection for chemicals in India. 23 The Committee noted that in countries where restrictions were placed on the patents for chemical inventions by confining patentability to the invented processes, there was a similar or even greater restriction on the grant of patents to inventions in relation to articles of food and medicine. This was to be expected, as most of the pharmaceutical preparations were the products of chemical processes.
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Around the same time, the pharmaceutical industry in India was also campaigning for changes to be brought to the patent laws, as it strongly believed that the Patents Act 1911 was not fit for purpose and had to be completely changed. 25 
Indian Patent Act 1970
India's first post-colonial legislation on patents, the Indian Patent Act 1970 came into force on 20 April 1972. The objectives of the Act were, to boost the Indian economic growth through indigenous technology development, to make the fruits of technological innovations to be accessible for public purposes (particularly in public health), to protect domestic enterprise, and to meet the constitutional obligations of the State under the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country. 26 The Patent Act 1970 was hailed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and some developing countries as a progressive statute. 27 The Act of 1970 recognized both process and product patents, but the latter was not available for food, medicine, or drugs or substance produced by chemical processes, and also redefined the working of the patents. 28 The two key features of the Act were the introduction of 'process patents' for inventions relating to food, medicine and chemical entities, and the shortening of the term of patent protection for pharmaceutical patents. 29 Under the Act of 1970 the term of process patent protection over food, drug, and medical inventions 23 Under the German Patent Law of 1877, where patentability was restricted to novel chemical processes, a stimulated research with regard to alternative methods for producing the same product was witnessed. The rise of the German chemical industry dated from 1877, and in the course of a period of 30 years, it witnessed tremendous growth and came to occupy the foremost position in Europe. See also Choudhary (n 3) 26-27. 24 Choudhary (n 3) 27.
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In 1961, the Indian Drug Manufacturers Association (IDMA) was formed for the purpose of boosting the national pharmaceutical industry. The organization campaigned for the amendment of the patent laws then prevailing in India. See generally, Hamied (n 9).
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Choudhary (n 3) 37. The objectives of the Act were in line with the State Policy contained in the Constitution of India which provided in Article 39 that … State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing (a) … (b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to serve the common good; and (c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, India (n 15) 10. 29 Ibid 11.
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was limited to five years. In essence, the process patent regime defined under s.5(1) of the Patent Act 1970 protected the method through which the product was arrived at, i.e. the process of making the product, and excluded the protection of the end-product. 30 It was, therefore, perfectly possible for several manufacturers to simultaneously hold a process patent for identical products.
The process patent regime under the Act of 1970 aided the Indian pharmaceutical companies to manufacture generic drugs using expired patents. The Act also introduced an automatic right to license (compulsory license) in the case of life-saving drugs. This safeguard along with the Drug Price Control Order 1970, which put a cap on the maximum price that could be charged, ensured that life-saving drugs were available at a reasonable price in India. 31 The process patent framework also enabled indigenous pharmaceutical companies to produce drugs at an affordable cost. The growth of the Indian generic pharmaceutical industry is largely attributed to the Indian Patents Act of 1970. It is also to be observed that the number of patent applications filed during the operation of the Act remained stagnant, 32 and it is arguable that it did not contribute to any major innovation in the pharmaceutical sector.
The Indian drug manufacturers, aided by the 1970 Act, were able to develop alternate processes for production of life-saving drugs. The domestic pharmaceutical industry in India developed over a relatively short period of time, making India self-sufficient in the production of basic drugs covering major therapeutic groups. 33 As a result, drug prices in India ranged from 5 to 30 times lower than in countries where 'product patent' was in place. The three decades that followed, saw India emerge as a globally recognized producer of low-priced generic drugs. 34 India is currently the leading exporter of generic antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) to other developing and least developed countries (LDCs), which is used in the treatment of HIV/AIDS. 35 The Indian Patents Act, 1970 is viewed by some 30 The Patents Act of 1970, s.5(1) reads as follows: In the case of inventions -(a) claiming substances intended for use, or capable of being used, as food or as medicine or drug, or, (b) relating to substances prepared or produced by chemical processes (including alloys, optical glass, semi-conductors and inter-metallic compounds), no patent shall be granted in respect of claims for the substance themselves, but claims for the methods or processes of manufacture shall be patentable.
31
India introduced drug price control measures during the Chinese conflict in 1962, amidst fears that it could escalate prices of essential drugs. These measures were taken with a view to making access to medicines affordable within the country. The Drug Price Control Order, introduced in 1970, imposed an indirect control on the profitability of pharmaceutical industries. M Das and SK Basu, 'Drug Price Control in India: "The Past and the Present" ' (2012) as a landmark in the history of industrial development in India, and by some others as having a negative effect to innovation in the country. 
WTO membership, TRIPS negotiation and compliance
The WTO, which is a rules-based organization, was established in January 1995. The TRIPS Agreement is one of the covered agreements of the WTO, and along with the agreements on trade in goods, and trade in services, constitutes the three pillars on which the organization operates. The TRIPS Agreement is seen as one of the most controversial components of the WTO system, due to its far-reaching implications on international intellectual property rights protection. It covers a wide range of intellectual property rights protection, from copyrights and trademarks, to patent rights and trade secrets. The Agreement obligates countries to grant product patents for a period of 20 years in all fields of technology, including pharmaceuticals. 37 The TRIPS Agreement sets out the minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property, including patents for pharmaceuticals. It requires all member states to establish legal and administrative procedures at the domestic level to ensure effective protection to patent holders (both domestic and international) for their intellectual property rights, and also the appropriate mechanism for redress in the event that their rights are infringed. member states failing to embody these standards into their national laws or to give effect to them may be challenged by the trading partners before the WTO following the dispute settlement procedures.
India's role in the TRIPS negotiation
The negotiations on the TRIPS Agreement were conducted during the long running Uruguay Round between 1986 and 1994. 38 Prior to these negotiations on the TRIPS Agreement, intellectual property rights were principally regulated at the international level by a number of treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which included the Paris Convention on Industrial Property and the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works. 39 The negotiations on TRIPS Agreement came about at a time when there was a deadlock between developed and less developed countries over the revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property before the 36 JO Lanjouw, 'The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patent in India -Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering' (1997) NBER Working Paper No. W6366, 3-4 <http://www.nber.org/ papers/w6366> accessed 15 September 2013. The author opines that the 1970 legislation weakened intellectual property protection available in India, particularly to pharmaceutical innovations. In the author's view the pharmaceutical product innovations, as well as those for food and agrochemicals, became un-patentable, allowing innovations patented elsewhere to be freely copied and marketed in India. 37 The TRIPS Agreement also contains flexibilities, including grant of compulsory licenses, and allowance of parallel imports. CM Correa, 'Intellectual Property Rights and Inequalities in Health Outcomes' in Ronald Labonté and others (eds), Globalization and Health: Pathways, Evidence and Policy (Routledge, 2009) 265. 38 The Uruguay Round was the eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations, and took over seven years to complete. WTO, 'The Uruguay Round' <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ tif_e/fact5_e.htm> accessed 12 September 2013. WIPO. 40 Close to 50 developing countries that sought membership at the WTO, were not granting patent monopolies for drugs at the time the Uruguay round of negotiations were taking place. 41 India was a vocal opponent of the initiative to include intellectual property rights in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system, and was seen as the voice of the developing countries at the TRIPS negotiations. In July 1989, it submitted a detailed paper elaborating the developing country perspective on the negotiations. 42 India, along with Brazil, Argentina and other developing countries, strongly criticized the proposal on the grounds that the GATT mandate did not allow for the discussion of substantive issues on intellectual property, and it was only the WIPO that had the institutional competence to discuss such issues. 43 The Indian position was debated extensively at the negotiations, 44 but towards the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 almost all developing countries had changed their position. The shift came about due the coercive strategies adopted by the USA, and as a result India found itself isolated in the negotiations. 45 During the same period, India had sought assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to address depletion in its foreign currency reserves which had brought it to the brink of an economic crisis. It is worth pointing out that the USA was the chief benefactor of the IMF at that time and heavily influenced any outcomes. 46 Due to a combination of its weak financial position and potential trade losses with the USA, India relaxed its opposition to the TRIPS Agreement at the negotiations. 47 With India agreeing to accede to the TRIPS UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 39) 7. India had all along argued that any principle or standard relating to IPRs should be carefully tested against the needs of developing countries, and that it would be inappropriate to focus the discussions on the protection of the monopoly rights of the owners of intellectual property, when almost 99% of the patents were owned by industrialized nations. It also stressed that substantive standards on intellectual property were more in the realm of socio-economic, industrial and technological development, especially in the case of developing countries. It urged that the group focus on restrictive and anti-competitive practices of the owners of IPR and evolve standards and principles for their elimination to avoid distortion of trade. Agreement, any opposition from the developing countries on the inclusion of intellectual property rights protection into the WTO's covered agreements came to an end.
Following concerns raised by African groups and supported by other developing countries, the Council for TRIPS 48 agreed to deal specifically with the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and public health. Developing countries had argued that the TRIPS Agreement did not limit their sovereign powers when addressing health crises such as HIV/AIDS, but on the other hand the USA and Switzerland argued that the only flexibility afforded by the Agreement was its staggered implementation in some cases. There was a growing concern amongst the developing countries that patent rules might restrict access to affordable medicines for their citizens, and also impede their efforts to control diseases of public health importance, including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. In June 2001, for the first time, the Council for TRIPS systematically considered the relationship between public health and TRIPS. 49 The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (the Doha Declaration) made on November 2001, helped in resolving the above concerns and other divergent perspectives and views held by the member states on the application and ambit of the TRIPS Agreement. 50 The concerns raised by India and other developing countries 51 regarding the implications of the TRIPS Agreement on public health were reflected in the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. WTO members also adopted a special Ministerial Declaration at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha to clarify ambiguities between the need for governments to apply the principles of public health and the terms of the Agreement on TRIPS. One of the key issues emphasized in the Doha Declaration was that the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement should 'be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.' 52 The Doha Declaration proclaimed that each member had the right to grant compulsory licenses, and to determine the grounds for the grant and also what constituted a national emergency.
To some degree the economic liberalization policy introduced in the early 1990s can be seen as one of the factors in India relaxing its robust opposition to the inclusion of intellectual property rights within the ambit of the WTO. 53 India's accession to the TRIPS Agreement, and its move from being a process patent regime to a product patent regime was viewed by some 54 in India as a clear departure from the vision the founders had of a free 48 The Council for TRIPS is charged with the monitoring of WTO members' compliance with their obligations under TRIPS. The legal basis for the establishment of the Council is found in Article IV.5 of the WTO Agreement, which stipulates that the Council 'shall oversee the functioning' of TRIPS Agreement. See also UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 39) 739. 49 The World Health Assembly had in 1996 examined the relationship between public health and the TRIPS Agreement, as it was mandated to report on the impact of the work of the WTO with respect to national drug policies and essential drugs. This was addressed in a resolution on the Revised Drug Strategy, Resolution WHA49.14 (25 May 1996). One of the strong critics of the TRIPS Agreement was Justice VR Krishna Iyer, a former judge of the Supreme Court of India and a panel member of the People's Commission on GATT, which filed its India. The action was strongly criticized, as it was first viewed as being in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Constitution of India, and second, the TRIPS Agreement valued and prioritized the economic gains of patent holders living in faraway countries, ahead of the millions who would suffer from non-availability of affordable medicines. 55 This was not just about India, but also about other developing and least developed Countries that relied strongly on the generic drugs produced by Indian drugs manufacturers.
TRIPS compliance
The accession to TRIPS Agreement mandated India to carry out fundamental changes to its existing intellectual property laws, especially in relation to patents.
56 India was to change its patent laws to recognize product patents and move away from process patents. Following the transitional arrangement provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, India was not required to comply with the product patent requirements of TRIPS until 2005, 57 while least developed Countries were given an extension up to 1 January 2016 by the TRIPS Council, which met in 2002. Nevertheless, India as per Art 70.8(a) was mandated to create a 'mailbox' for the filing of patent applications that would be examined when changes to the law were made and came into effect in 2005. 58 The mailbox facility set up by India following the Appellate Body's report, 59 allowed for the filing of pharmaceutical product patent applications pending the introduction of changes to the Patent Act of 1970.
The TRIPS Agreement also required the grant of exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) for mailbox applications 60 that met specific conditions during the transitional period. Under Article 70.9, if the products featured in the mailbox applications were granted patent, and had also obtained marketing approval in any of the WTO member countries, then India was obligated to grant a five year EMRs before the patent on the product was either granted or rejected in India. 61 In March 1999, India passed the Patents (Amendment) Act 1999, 62 to implement the mailbox procedure as per Article 65(4) of the TRIPS Agreement. The 1999 Act was given retroactive effect from 1 January 1995 to facilitate receipt of patent applications for pharmaceutical and agro-chemical products under the mailbox procedure.
A second amendment to the 1970 Act was made in 2002, which introduced a 20 year patent term, 63 reversed the burden of proof for process patent infringement, and also modified the compulsory licensing requirements. 64 The passing of the 2002 Amendment Act also concluded India's accession to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883, and the Patent Co-operation Treaty 1970. The combined effect meant that the India had to follow the national treatment principles laid down in the Paris Convention and also grant a 12 month priority period for foreign applicants who had previously filed a patent application in their home countries. 65 One of the notable changes brought about by the 2002 amendment was the grounds for seeking compulsory license of pharmaceutical patents. Broadly, a compulsory license can be sought in the case of non-working of the patented work after three years of sealing of the patent, in the event of a national emergency (through a government notification), or in certain cases where patents are essential for the efficient working of other patented inventions. 66 In conclusion it can be stated that the 2002 Amendment laid the groundwork for the passing of the Patent (Amendment) Act 2005.
The Amendment Act 2005
The membership of the WTO was expected to spur the economic growth of a nation, and India was doing as much as possible to create an environment to achieve this goal and bring in foreign investment. To this end, and to meet the obligation as a WTO member, 14 October 2013. Around 9000 mailbox applications were filed during the transition period, of which 84% originated from multinational corporations, with Pfizer coming first. Indian submissions totalled for 1406, including 1300 in the pharmaceutical sector. Applications from the USA topped the list, followed by India, Germany and the UK. Prior to the 2002 Amendment, pharmaceutical process patents issued under the 1970 Act lasted for a period of five years from sealing, or seven years from the date of the patent, whichever was less. 67 This Amendment Act was preceded by a presidential ordinance in 2004. 68 The efforts to make changes to the patent laws generated much controversy even in the discussion stages, 69 both in India and abroad, as the action of the Indian Government was seen as overzealous in some quarters. 70 The NGOs and the World Health Organization (WHO) in particular, were concerned about the plight of the HIV/AIDS sufferers in the least developed Countries and those who were strongly reliant on Indian generic drugs. 71 On the one hand India was bound by its obligations to WTO, the international body facilitating negotiations in world trade, and on the other hand it was strongly urged by a UN Special Envoy to ensure that India's new patent laws did not harm the supply of generic drugs to the developing countries. 72 The picture that emerged at that time was a collage of worry, expectation and disbelief, as it was generally perceived that any action taken to change the patent regime other than a process patent will have a long lasting impact on India and its generic drug producers, on pharmaceutical patents around the world, and most importantly on millions of sufferers of HIV/AIDS living in the least developed Countries, 73 who were heavily reliant on India's generic ARVs. There was also a growing feeling that the Indian government was working on a TRIPS compliant patent legislation that could potentially jeopardize access to medicines for many poor patients in the developing world. Against this backdrop, India passed the Patent (Amendment) Act 2005, to bring its patent laws in line with the TRIPS Agreement, while bearing in mind its unwritten commitment to the developing countries and least developed Countries that almost exclusively relied on its generic drugs to do battle with the scourge of HIV/AIDS. The 2005 Amendment Act, contains a wider framework for compulsory licensing, incorporates procedures governing both 'pregrant' and 'post-grant' opposition to patent applications, contains provisions on 'patentable subject matter' and 'exhaustion of patent rights,' and most importantly witnesses the setting up of an 'inventive step' for patentability into the patent regime. 
Compulsory licensing
The discussion on the issue of compulsory license became more intense in the 1990s with the HIV/AIDS crisis. The population that is most affected from the crises live in developing and least developed countries, where generic ARVs are seen as the only answer, as patented drugs for the treatment of the disease are absolutely unaffordable. Currently, India is the leading exporter of generic ARVs in the world. 74 Patent protection is cited as one of the reasons for the limited availability and affordability of medication for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. 75 Compulsory licensing of patented drugs is said to be one of the essential pillars of the patent system, and found in international conventions, 76 that enables the access to essential medicines in times of need. It is well recognized that compulsory licences play an important role in preventing abuse of patent rights that may arise, when a patent holder, using its statutory rights, tries to pre-empt entry of competitors. 77 The Doha Declaration states that every WTO member has 'the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.' 78 As mentioned earlier, the Amendment Act 2005 contains a much liberal framework for the grant of compulsory license, and the Indian government preserved the original provisions of the 1970 Patents Act regarding compulsory licensing for use within India.
79 Similar provisions on compulsory licensing have also been introduced into Brazilian legislation. 80 Under s.84 of the Act, an application for compulsory license is sustainable three years from the grant of a patent, upon successfully satisfying the condition that the 'reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied,' that 'the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonable price,' and lastly the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India. 81 The circumstances for 'reasonable requirements of the public' would arise if the patent holder refuses to grant a licence on reasonable terms. This refusal, in turn, can affect the development of new trade or industry 74 Waning and others (n 35). 75 Ibid.
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Article 5A of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property provides for the signatories to the Convention to have the right 'to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.' Under Art 5A 'failure to work,' or 'insufficient working' of a patent would tantamount to abuse of the patent rights, and can be seen as giving raise to grounds for the grant of compulsory license. See generally Articles 68-74, Chapter VIII, Section III, Law No. 9.279 of 14 May 1996, to Regulate Rights and Obligations Relating to Industrial Property (Brazilian Laws), which provides for the grant of compulsory licences under various circumstances. It is worth mentioning that Brazil used the threat of compulsory licenses on the patent for Glivec (marketed in the USA as Gleevec) to obtain a price discount of more than 65%. 81 The Act contains a list of instances where the reasonable requirements of the public shall be deemed to be unsatisfied. in the country, the establishment or development of commercial activities in India, and the development of the export market for a patented article manufactured in India. 82 Some NGOs have raised concerns about the three-year lock-in period prescribed under s.86(6) for lodging an application for the grant of compulsory license. Their concerns relate to the plight of HIV/AIDS sufferers living in developing and least developed countries, who were fast developing resistance to first-generation ARV drugs, and therefore will be in need of second and third-generation drugs in a short time. These second and third-generation drugs are mostly under patent, and going by s.84(6) will not be available for compulsory licensing for three years. 83 The Indian Government in its Amendment Act 2005 expanded the opportunities to obtain compulsory licences for export of patented pharmaceuticals to least developed Countries. The new Act confers on the government the powers to grant a compulsory license in circumstances involving national health emergencies, 84 and it also provides the mechanisms to manufacture and export patented medicines to other countries that do not have the necessary infrastructure to manufacture drugs. 85 From a reading of the relevant provisions on compulsory licensing, it is clear that the Indian Government and the Controller of Patents are vested with sweeping powers to grant compulsory licenses in suitable cases. Before the grant of any compulsory license the concerned authority is required to take into account additional factors such as, the nature of the invention and the measures already taken by the patentee or licensee to make full use of the invention, the ability of the applicant to work the invention to the public advantage, the capacity of the applicant to undertake the risk in providing capital and working the invention, and the efforts made by the applicant to obtain a licence from patentee on reasonable terms and conditions and that such efforts were not successful within a reasonable period. Ibid. The new s.92A titled 'Compulsory License for Export of Patented Pharmaceutical Products in Certain Exceptional Circumstances' expressly provides for the manufacture of essential medicines in response to public health crises. Section 92A(1) enjoins that the importing country must have 'insufficient' or 'no manufacturing' capacity, and allows for the importation of patented pharmaceutical products from India. license' granted to the generics producers. 88 Since the introduction of the new laws in 2005, the offices of the Controller of Patents, having offices in the four major cities in India, have been inundated with applications from overseas corporations. During the same period there had been a number of applications received from Indian generic drugs manufacturers for grant of compulsory license. In this regard, a couple of decisions made by the authorities in India in recent months are taken up for study as they present contrasting pictures. 89 This was seen by some industry experts as a strategic move by Natco, as there were pending infringement actions against Natco, brought by Bayer. Natco argued that Bayer's patented drug, Nexavar, had not been made available to the public at a reasonably affordable price, and that the reasonable requirements of the public had not been met. It was also Natco's case that Bayer failed to work the patent in India within the specified three-year period, as it was still importing the drug into the country although it had a manufacturing unit in India, which in turn resulted in an unaffordable price being charged for the drug in India.
4.
It was Bayer's case that a 'reasonably affordable price' should be calculated with reference to the public as well as the patentee and the price of the patented drugs has to be sufficient to support future drug development. Further, 'working' in relation to patents in India meant supplying the drug to the Indian market on a commercial scale, that the relatively small market demand for Nexavar did not justify the manufacture of the product in India, and that Bayer was providing the drug only to 2% of the estimated number of patients in India Prior to lodging the above application, Natco Pharmaceuticals had filed applications for grant of compulsory license under s.92A of the Indian Patent Act for two cancer drugs, namely, Suninat and Tarceva as early as 2007. Suninat and Tarceva are patented to Pfizer and Roche, respectively. Natco intended to manufacture and export them to Nepal, but later withdrew its application for grant of compulsory license. requirements under the Indian Patent Act, as it did not manufacture the drug Nexavar in India. 90 On 9 March 2012, the first compulsory licence was granted by the Indian Controller of Patents at Mumbai, on the application taken out by Natco to manufacture and sell a generic version of the drug Nexavar. The drug manufactured under the compulsory license by Natco, was to cost nearly 30 times lower than that was being charged by the patent holder Bayer Corporation, and Natco was to pay Bayer a quarterly royalty at 6% of the net sales of the drug. Bayer Corporation challenged the decision of the Controller of Patents before the Intellectual Property Appeal Board (IPAB), Chennai. The IPAB in its judgement dated 14 September 2012, confirming the order of the Controller of Patents, held that Bayer did not satisfy the reasonable requirement of the public and that the drug was not made available at a reasonably affordable price. Bayer has since challenged the decision of the IPAB before the High Court in Mumbai. The Controller's observations on 'local working' by Bayer on the drug Nexavar will prove controversial, as almost 90% of the drugs patented in India to multinationals are not manufactured in India, and could be susceptible to compulsory license. 91 Worthy of noting is the fact that compulsory license was granted on an application taken out by a third party and not by the government, and all parties concerned were heard following the principles and procedures set out under the TRIPS compliant Indian patent legislation.
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Some have expressed the view it is possible that India might be in violation of the nondiscrimination principle mandated under Article 27(1) TRIPS, 93 and others have opined that going by WTO decision in the Canada -Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products 94 the action is unlikely to constitute any violation. 95 In the aftermath of the IPAB's decision in the above case, there are signs that patent holding multinationals are forging alliances with local manufacturers in India, as they view voluntary licensing to local partners under mutually agreeable terms as an effective way to avoid compulsory licensing and also at the same time expand their market presence in the region. 96 The swiftness with which the 90 In the proceedings Bayer argued that Cipla, another Indian generic drugs manufacturer, had been marketing a generic version of Nexavar in India at a much lower price since April-May 2010, such that no objection regarding the medicine's availability could be legitimately raised. However, the Controller noted that Bayer had commenced infringement proceedings against Cipla, and thus the sales carried out by an alleged infringer should not be taken into account to support Bayer's position. Basheer (n 91). The author also argues that TRIPS is premised on the promise of technology transfer to developing countries, and that a local working provision is geared towards encouraging such technology transfer. 97 in the USA, Europe and Switzerland, and that it had the capacity to manufacture and supply the drugs in India. It was also contended by BDR that its efforts to engage the patentee in a dialogue for the purposes of securing a grant of a voluntary license were fruitless, and hence it was constrained to approach the Controller of Patents with an application for grant of compulsory license for the drug Dasatinib. The patentee Bristol-Myers, in contrast, was able to demonstrate that it did respond in time to the applicant's request for voluntary license and sought additional information regarding BDR's capabilities, intent, etc., but did not receive any response from the applicant.
The Controller of Patents concluded that the applicant BDR failed to satisfy the requirements for grant of a compulsory license under s.84 of the Indian Patent Act. The Controller of Patents observed that the stage to make a decision on the merits of the case presented under s.84 had not arrived yet, as the applicant deliberately refrained from engaging in any kind of dialogue with the patentee for the purposes of securing the grant of a voluntary license, and also the applicant did not follow the scheme of law and the procedure mandated for the grant of a compulsory license under s.84 of the Indian Patent Act.
To the patentee Bristol-Myers, the decision is a relief, as it did not lose any revenue on its patent, but is a big disappointment to millions of patients suffering from CML, as the drug will not be accessible due its very high price. In India, a month's dose of the drug costs about Rs 100,000, and BDR's application for compulsory license was based on the premise that it will be able to sell a month's dose of the drug for a mere Rs 8100. In sharp contrast to the response to the decision made in the Natco v. Bayer case, which was received with shock by multinational drug manufacturers operating in India, the decision in the BDR v. Bristol-Myers case was received in muted silence. The above two applications for grant of compulsory licenses were made under s.84 of the Indian Patent Act. The decision demonstrates that Indian authorities are keen to interpret the law in the light of its true purport, and compulsory licence will not be granted on all applications. Orphan drugs are used in the treatment of patients with rare diseases. The term orphan drug is used both in US and EU legislations to describe a drug that is indicated for a rare disease, or 'orphan disease.' Under the US Orphan Drug Act, 'orphan drug' designation is accorded if the drug is intended to treat a condition affecting fewer than 200,000 of the population in the USA, or which will not be profitable within seven years following approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In the EU it is intended to treat a disease affecting fewer than 5 per 10,000 of the population.
Other developments
In February 2013, while the above applications for the grant of compulsory licenses were pending, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) sought details from the Indian Health Ministry regarding three medicines sold by Roche and Bristol-Myers Squibb. The drugs in question were Trastuzumab, Ixabepilone and Dasatinib, which are expensive and unaffordable, and used in the treatment of cancer. 98 As a follow up, in August 2013, the DIPP has had further discussions with the Drug Controller General of India (DCGI) on whether marketing approval had been sought for the above drugs by generic drug makers, as it was considering a health ministry proposal for issuing a compulsory license for Trastuzumab under s.92 of the Indian Patent Act. 99 Section 92(1) of the Patent Act vests discretionary powers on the Indian Government to issue a compulsory licence in circumstances of national emergency, extreme urgency, or in case of public non-commercial use. Any decisions taken by the DIPP in this regard will have a major impact on the generics pharmaceutical industry in India and the accessibility to medicines for cancer treatment.
The requirement of the statute is that the grant of the compulsory licence must be 'necessary' for such purposes mentioned, and the same is to be followed by a declaration by notification in the Official Gazette. 100 According to s.117A of the Patents Act, the notification under s.92 may be challenged at the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB), and in addition, it may also be challenged at the High Court In a separate development, the Swiss drug manufacturer Roche decided not to seek extension of its patent for the cancer drug Herceptin in India, which expired in May 2013, thereby paving the way for generic drug makers to manufacture the drug. 101 Roche had come under severe pressure from the Indian Government to cut the prices of key anti-cancer drugs as it is beyond the reach of a large number of cancer patients. It is pertinent to mention that Biocon-Mylan, Reliance Life Sciences and BDR are some of the companies who are currently working on a copy of the cancer drug Herceptin in India. 102 4.1.3.1. Criticism. The procedure laid down for the grant of compulsory license under the new laws is cumbersome and long drawn, with no time limit specified in the Act or the Rules for the disposal of an application. Lack of clarity in this regard could see the 98 compulsory license provision becoming redundant and unusable for the purposes for which it was incorporated into the Act. Further, the Act does not fully utilize the TRIPS flexibilities, as any final decision regarding the use of a patented invention under compulsory license can be challenged in a court of law and an injunction sought to prevent the use of a patented invention. 103 Under Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement there is no obligation on the part of a Member State to provide for the remedy of injunction against government use. The practices in the USA and UK, in this regard are different and less cumbersome, as the governments in both countries can take over the patented invention without seeking a license or engage in lengthy negotiations with the patent holder. The only remedy available is for the patent holder to sue the government for compensation, and not for an injunction. 104 Some commentators opine that India, with public sector pharmaceutical industry, should strengthen the government use provisions in its Patent Act 105 and remove any uncertainties.
4.1.3.2. Question. The question that comes to haunt us is, if such grant of compulsory licenses will in any way fail to provide incentives to innovate in India, and drive away international corporations from India. Critics of the compulsory license regime have always argued that grant of compulsory license discourages innovation. Issuing of patent is strongly predicated on the premise that it encourages innovation by offering a limited monopoly to the patentee, which presents the argument that compulsory licenses will kill off innovation. There is no strong empirical evidence to suggest that compulsory licences do have a negative effect on innovation. 106 In contrast, the studies available only indicate that compulsory licenses do not have any significant demonstrable effect on the rate and pace of innovation.
107 There are also others who seriously question the efficacy of the compulsory licensing system under the TRIPS Agreement, which they think has not helped in achieving the goal of access to affordable medicines. 108 For now, the evidence seems to suggest that grant of compulsory license does not affect innovation in the Indian pharmaceutical sector which is dominated by generic manufacturers. opposition under the amended patent laws is viewed by some developed countries as a controversial step, as it slows down the grant of patents.
Pre-grant and post-grant opposition
The Patent (Amendment) Act 2005 also provides for taking out a post-grant opposition within one year from the date of publication of the grant of patent, and the same can be viewed as a second-window of opportunity for lodging any opposition. 110 Under this provision any 'interested person' may give notice of opposition to the Controller in the prescribed manner on any of the grounds mentioned in s.25 of the Patent (Amendment) Act 2005. The grounds for both pre-grant and post-grant opposition are identical, and there is nothing in the Act to preclude a pre-grant opponent from subsequently filing a postgrant opposition on the same patent.
Criticism
The opposition at the pre-grant stage is more by way of representation as opposed to notice of opposition, and further, there is no scope for an appeal against the decision of the Controller on any pre-grant opposition. 111 The only remedy that is open to the aggrieved party in such circumstances is to seek judicial review under the Constitution of India, 112 which can be a lengthy procedure allowing the patent holder to enjoy a wrongful monopoly during the pendency of such proceedings before the court. Some generic drugs manufacturers and public interest groups have utilized the pre-grant provisions to prevent frivolous patents, but the provision still remains under utilized due to barriers in accessing information. 113 Denial of access to, or non-disclosure of information on pending applications pose serious threat as the Indian Patent Office does not publish full details of pending applications. It is important to clarify this provision, especially when India has introduced measures to check the practice of patent evergreening. The Novartis case which is discussed in the next section of this article arose out of pre-grant oppositions lodged by generic drugs manufacturers and NGOs.
Patentability and patent evergreening
The Justice Ayyangar Committee report had recommended 114 the introduction of process patents into the patent laws in India. The recommendations were based on a detailed, indepth study of post-independent India's economic and social conditions, and the need to develop a self-reliant and self-sufficient nation. After close to 35 years, 115 India has 110 Article 99 of the European Patent Convention (EPC) allows for an opposition to be filed by any person within nine months of the publication of the grant of the European Patent (EP) in the European Patent Bulletin (EPB). Any opposition lodged applies to the EP patent in all contracting States where the EP patent has effect. The USA has a provision for re-examination to challenge the validity of a granted patent. Here again, the re-examination procedure can be invoked by any person at any time during the period of enforceability of a patent. The US re-examination procedures are detailed and fall under two categories, namely, ex parte re-examination and inter partes re-examination. 111 Gopakumar (n 87) 345. However, it is to be pointed that the Madras High Court allowed Novartis to challenge the order passed by the Controller under the pre-grant procedure before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). (d) The mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant.
Explanation: For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combicountries and other derivatives of known substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.
Section 3(d) is aimed at denying patent for trivial modifications on existing patents and preventing the practice of 'evergreening.' The expression evergreening 116 is used to identify the practice of obtaining multiple patents that cover different aspects of the same product, and is also known variously as 'stockpiling,' 'life-cycle management,' 'patentlayering,' and 'line-extension.' Evergreening in effect, refers to the attempts by pharmaceutical patent owners to extend the term of patents they already hold through modified forms of the same drug, new delivery systems and new uses for the drug, 117 and scholars have expressed serious concerns about the practice. 118 Pharmaceutical companies resort to the practice with a view to maximizing on the monopoly period enjoyed by the patented drug. 119 Multiple patenting of known substances, or evergreening, considerably delays and poses a threat for the legal entry of generics into the market, and can successfully prevent competition in the pharmaceutical market. Some from the pharmaceutical industry believe that the term 'evergreening' is pejorative and is misleading.
120
When India set up the 'mailbox' under the transitional arrangements, 121 it received close to 9000 applications, and a number of the overseas applications lodged by multinational corporations through the system could be said to fall under the above category of 'evergreening.' 121 The Patents (Amendment) Act 1999 (n 62). 122 Dhar and Gopakumar (n 61) 8-9. The authors refer to the practice of granting patents to incrementally modified drugs (IMDs) in the USA, and how an overwhelming majority of the applications received through the 'mailbox' set up by India would be falling under the IMDs category.
India's pharmaceutical industry, being strongly driven by generic drugs manufacturers, required a strict patentability criterion to ensure the early entry of generics into the market. The introduction of s.3(d) was seen as the answer, as it aims to both increase the threshold limit of patentability criteria and also exclude certain types of inventions from the ambit of the Patent Act. This section seeks to disallow the patenting of a known substance unless it results in an enhancement of the efficacy of that substance, and can be viewed as a bold legislative step to curb the practice of 'evergreening.' 123 Importantly, s.3(d) applies to both pharmaceutical patents and chemical patents.
The section encourages sequential developments of existing products or technologies that help bring in improved products to the market, as opposed to evergreening which can be seen as the improper extension of patent monopoly of a pharmaceutical product. 124 It is the first step in bringing about a fundamental shift in the way pharmaceutical patent applications are to be scrutinized henceforth, in India. Judicial precedent has been set in the USA 125 and the UK, 126 both common law countries and holding a number of pharmaceutical patents, to discourage the practice of evergreening within their jurisdictions. Introduction of s.3(d) into the patent laws can be viewed as a definitive legislative measure taken by India to tackle 'evergreening.' Interestingly, the USA topped the list of pharmaceutical patent applications lodged when India set up the 'mailbox' under the transitional arrangement, with the UK coming fourth in the list behind Germany. 127 It is worth mentioning here that a number of applications received from multinationals through the 'mailbox' can be seen as attempts at 'evergreening' of existing patents. Also, the U.S. Hatch-Waxman Act 1984 provides for financial incentives, and encourages generic firms to identify and challenge improperly issued secondary patents. That said, the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, cannot be equated to the Indian Patent Act, which also provides for pre-grant opposition under the 2005 amendment. 126 The courts in the UK follow similar principles to discourage patent 'evergreening.' See the Court of Appeal decision in Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc [2008] EWCA Civ 445. The court while dismissing the appeal held that Servier's patent was invalid for lack of novelty and obviousness, and Lord Justice Jacob observed that 'It is the sort of patent which can give the patent system a bad name … The only solution to this type of undesirable patent is a rapid and efficient method for obtaining its revocation. Then it can be got rid of before it does too much harm to the public interest.' 127 Narendranath (n 60). 128 Dhar and Gopakumar (n 61) 8-9. 129 The expression 'free base' is commonly used in organic chemistry and pharmaceutical research to describe the 'deprotonated' amine form of a chemical compound. It refers to the pure basic form of an amine, as opposed to the salt form.
action that allows the cancer to grow. Although it does not cure the disease, it is seen as a step forward in the treatment of cancer. Novartis also marketed Glivec in the USA under the trade name Gleevec.
Novartis lodged its application for a patent in India through the 'mailbox' on 17 July 1998, and also applied for an EMR. 130 With the grant of the EMR in 2003, the consumers in India saw a 10-fold increase in the price of Glivec. Novartis' patent application for Glivec faced severe opposition from Indian generic manufacturers (against who Novartis had filed infringement suits) and the NGO, Cancer Patients Aid Association (CPAA). The main grounds for opposition were that the application lacked novelty, it did not demonstrate any significant 'efficacy' under s.3(d), it did not have any obviousness, and it also had a wrongful priority. The opposition could be heard at a stage prior to the grant of patent, as the 2005 Amendment Act had provided for a 'pre-grant' opposition 131 The court also observed that the government had a constitutional duty to provide good health care to its citizens through access to medicines, and for that purpose there should be suitable legislative measures in place to prevent the practice of 'evergreening,' which has a negative impact on the availability of affordable medicines. The petition challenging the decision of the Controller of patents dealing with patentability of Glivec was heard by the IPAB, at Chennai, which also ruled against Novartis.
Novartis was granted special leave to appeal against the above decisions to the Supreme Court of India. A total of five appeals were lodged, and on 1 April 2013, the Supreme Court of India delivered its detailed judgement on the matter. 136 The Supreme Court ruled that imatinib mesylate was a known substance since 1994 and does not qualify as an 'invention' in terms of clause (j) and (ja) of s.2(1). 137 Further, it also held that the beta-crystalline form does not satisfy the requirements of the criterion set under s.3(d). The court concluded that s.3(d) was meant to create a 'second tier of qualifying standards' for chemical substances to combat 'any attempt at repetitive patenting or extension of the patent term on spurious grounds.' Most importantly the Supreme Court interpreted efficacy to mean therapeutic efficacy. 138 Here, the Supreme Court was linking patenting to therapeutic benefit, or more precisely net benefits to society, thereby highlighting the relevance of specific conditions prevalent in a country for deciding the appropriate patent regime. 139 The court rejected the appeal, as in its view Novartis could not demonstrate that the new form of the known substance was capable of enhancing the therapeutic efficacy of the drug. When Novartis made its application through the 'mailbox,' it was not required to make out a case for therapeutic benefit as s.3(d) was non-existent, and was only to be introduced later in 2005. Nevertheless, when Novartis was given the opportunity to produce evidence to demonstrate the therapeutic efficacy of beta-crystalline at the 'pre-grant opposition' stage, it did not do so as there was no study carried out and available to that effect. 140 Novartis also argued that its research and development had to be recouped and hence the high price for the drug. 141 What is interesting is the patent that was at issue before the Indian Supreme Court was also the target of a Hatch-Waxman challenge in the USA in 2007, 142 and Novartis did not appear to have litigated in response to this challenge, suggesting that it accepted the patent as questionable even in the USA. 143 The Supreme Court's rejection of Novartis' application means that generic drug makers can continue to sell copies of the drug at an affordable price in India. While Novartis has, naturally, not welcomed the decision, the Indian public, the health economists, and other interest groups have all welcomed the decision and view it as a landmark judgement. The Novartis case, through its legal debate on s. flexibilities. 155 In summary the introduction of s.3(d) is a positive step taken by the Indian law makers to tackle the menace of 'evergreening' practiced by pharmaceutical patent holders. ...develop on lines where the scope of the patent is determined not on intrinsic worth of the invention but by the artful drafting of its claims, and where patents are traded as a commodity not for production and marketing of the patented products but to search for someone who may be sued for infringement of the patent.
This observation was obviously aimed at the modern day practices of multinational pharmaceutical corporations. The questions that need answering are, not only about the Indian patent laws, but also about the actions of multinational corporations who, well supported by their national governments (through lobbying), have sought to exploit new and emerging patent legislations in the post-TRIPS era to their advantage, and also the actions of developed countries in exerting pressure on developing countries to change their laws and policies on intellectual property rights, 157 which continues to have a devastating impact on access to affordable medicines. This leads us to the next, inevitable question, for how long will WTO permit developed countries to negotiate on access to medicines with intellectual property rights?
Exhaustion of patent rights and parallel imports
India took advantage of the TRIPS flexibility to introduce a few key provisions into its patent laws which included, amongst others, the exhaustion of patent rights and parallel importation. India viewed this as an important step as it had emerged as a key player in producing and exporting generic drugs with the introduction of process patents under the 1970 Act. The TRIPS Agreement allows member states to determine the scope and extent of exhaustion of patent rights. Article 28(6) of the TRIPS Agreement states that 'This right [i.e., the right of importation], like all other rights conferred under this Agreement in respect of the use, sale, importation or other distribution of goods, is subject to the provisions of Article 6.' In turn, Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement postulates that 'nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.' Article 5(d) of the Doha Declaration provides that the effect of the provisions of TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment … In other words the TRIPS Agreement does not pose any restrictions on the application of the doctrine of exhaustion in domestic patent laws, despite dissenting views. 158 The Indian Patent Amendment Act recognizes and implements the principle of international exhaustion of patent rights. This principle imposes certain limits on the patentee's exclusive rights, in that the patentee cannot control the resale or redistribution of the particular product that had already been sold. 159 Under this provision, once a patented product has been sold with the patentee's approval outside India, the subsequent importation of that same patented item into India will not amount to infringement of the Indian patent. 160 This principle is recognized in countries like, India, Japan, Taiwan, Kenya, Andean Group Countries, Australia and New Zealand, but not recognized in a number of other jurisdictions like the USA, European Union (EU), Brazil and China. 161 The provision was first introduced under s.107(A)(b) of the Patents (Amendment) Act 2002, which provided that the ' … importation of patented products by any person from a person who is duly authorized by the patentee to sell or distribute the product, shall not be considered as an infringement of patent rights.' It was considered restrictive in scope, and was amended by the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005, which states that 'importation of patented products by any person from a person who is duly authorized under the law to produce and sell or distribute the product, shall not be considered as an infringement of patent rights.' 162 Parallel imports, which are but a natural corollary of the doctrine of exhaustion, helps in the increased allocation of products at the lowest possible price. It is likened to compulsory licenses and can act as an important device to discipline the markets and to induce suppliers to commercialize their pharmaceutical products on reasonable conditions. 163 Some writers even opine that parallel imports through compulsory licenses may in some cases be the only way to gain access to affordable medicine, especially when the TRIPS agreement is fully implemented. 164 Recognition of parallel imports can be seen as an emerging trend amongst developing countries that have proceeded to introduce an express statutory provision incorporating international exhaustion of patent rights into their national laws with the aim of ensuring their citizens' access to lower-cost medicines.
Pitfalls
The new patent regime introduced under the Amendment Act 2005 gives India the necessary legal framework to protect its patent system from practice of patent 'evergreening,' and also expands the scope of granting compulsory licenses in the event of any emergencies. Before the introduction of the TRIPS compliant patent laws into its legislation, there were intense debates in the Indian parliament and in other forums across the country, which demonstrated the elaborate democratic process the proposals went through. If the new patent laws are to work to India's benefit, it will have to address a few shortcomings in the new legislation, the accompanying procedures, and in the national drugs policy.
In 2002, in anticipation of the new patent laws, India introduced a Pharmaceutical Policy 166 aimed at improvement of incentives for research and development within the Indian pharmaceutical industry to achieve sustainable growth. 167 This policy proposed the reduction of the number of drugs under price control, but came to be stayed through a Supreme Court order. 168 The price control mechanism is one of the flexibilities available under the TRIPS Agreement to ensure access to medicines, 169 and every developing country should make use of it to make access to medicines affordable. India announced a revised National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy (NPPP) in November 2012, which sought to cap the price of 348 drugs. 170 The NPPP and the Drugs (Prices Control) Order 2013 have now come to be challenged before the Supreme Court by the All India Drug Action Network (AIDAN). 171 This drug price control policy could see yet another revision in the months to come. India cannot afford to indulge in arbitrary drug price policies if it were to take full advantage of the TRIPS flexibilities and implement the new patent laws. Since the passing of the new patent laws in 2005, India has witnessed the acquisition of a number of generic pharmaceutical companies by multinational corporations. These acquisitions do not bode well for India and other developing countries, as they undermine the future availability of affordable medicines and as well as the effective use of the WTO TRIPS flexibilities, including pre-grant opposition and compulsory license under the new Act. A study carried out by the India's Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce recommended a blanket ban 172 on the acquisition 173 of Indian pharmaceutical companies by multinational corporations. The Committee noted that the multinational corporations have encroached upon the Indian generic industry base, and was unanimous in its view in seeking a ban on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the existing pharmaceutical sector.
A number of external factors too can be identified as posing threats to the full implementation of the new patent laws. The USA, in particular, has been critical of the new patent laws introduced in India. The US Trade Representative (USTR) has repeatedly identified India's introduction of s.3(d) as the reason for putting it on the priority watch list, 174 which can be viewed as a tactic adopted by the USA to exert pressure on India to change its patent laws. It is interesting, as the USA has the Hatch-Waxman Act within its patent legislation, which aims to produce a similar result as s.3(d), but albeit at a later stage. The USA and EU have through the incorporation of TRIPS plus provisions in Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) 175 preserved the practice of evergreening for their multinationals in other jurisdictions. India is party to over 25 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and is currently engaged in negotiating FTAs with Japan and the EU. It is understood that the EU has demanded extended terms of patent protection from India, which could potentially undermine India's efforts in putting an end to the practice of evergreening. It is abundantly clear that TRIPS plus provisions in RTAs and FTAs can pose a major challenge to India in the full realization of its TRIPS compliant patent laws, and India may be pressurized during negotiations to let evergreening through its backdoor. 176 The USA with other key trading partners have negotiated the 'secretive' AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 177 which, if ratified can undermine India's new patent laws besides seriously harming India's position as a generic manufacturer of drugs. 
Conclusion
Through the new patent law framework, India has once again demonstrated it can take the lead role in presenting a patent law regime which can serve as a useful model for other 173 India introduced changes to its FDI policy relating to the pharmaceutical sector in 2011, which allowed 100% FDI in both new and existing pharmaceutical business. 174 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (n 154). 175 RTAs and FTAs have facilitated international trade prior to the advent of the WTO, and to some degree also facilitated regional integration. Although RTAs and FTAs potentially undermine the principles of the WTO, it is not prohibited under the rules. As of 31 July 2013, some 575 notifications of RTAs have been received by the WTO, of which, 379 were in force. See 'Regional Trade Agreements' World Trade Organization <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm> accessed 22 January 2014. 176 Gopakumar (n 150) 59. The author is of the view that Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) may prevent India from the taking effective measures to curb patents on known substances, and advocates the removal of intellectual property rights from the definition of investments. 177 The ACTA is a plurilateral agreement, initiated by the USA and Japan in 2006. The agreement signed in October 2011, seeks to establish an international standard for intellectual property rights enforcement through an international legal framework targeting counterfeit goods, and most importantly generic medicines. If ratified, this agreement will see the creation of a separate governing body outside the WTO, WIPO and UN for the purposes of enforcement. Most strikingly, developing nations, least developed countries (LDCs), civil society groups and the general public were clearly excluded from the negotiation process. developing countries to emulate. 179 Since its introduction in 2005, the patent law provisions have been frequently invoked by multinational pharmaceutical companies seeking the grant of patents, and on such other occasions by generic drugs manufacturers and NGOs seeking the pre-grant and post-grant opposition, and for grant of compulsory licenses. The decisions taken serve as a stark warning on the bumpy road ahead for the multinationals seeking to extend the life span of patents through evergreening, and also to the Indian generic pharmaceutical industry seeking grant of compulsory licenses. It also serves as a reminder to the other developing countries that are heavily reliant on the Indian generic ARVs for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, on the difficulties of obtaining a compulsory license. The interpretation of s.3(d) of the Patent Act by the Indian Supreme Court in the Novartis case demonstrates the unequivocal position taken by India to protect its own patent jurisdiction from being subjected to abuse by multinational pharmaceutical companies through the practice of evergreening. The Supreme Court judgement sets the boundaries on granting patents and on the practice of patent evergreening, and is to be viewed as a benchmark.
Some writers have expressed the view that the patenting trend prevalent in developed countries is not in the interest of the consumers, 180 which makes medicines unaffordable, and have suggested developing countries to follow in the footsteps of India by introducing similar provisions as s.3(d) into their patent legislations to make medicines more affordable. 181 The provision as incorporated by the Indian legislation may suit India's requirements, as it has a robust judiciary to interpret the provisions justly in the light of the objectives of the amendment, and it also boasts of a good infrastructure for manufacturing generics drugs. Besides, India does not face the same problems as other developing countries and LDCs in the knowledge economy. At this point, the judgement of the Indian Supreme Court can only be seen as a result of the first of the few battles to come on Indian patent laws, and the Indian court rooms will not be the only domain where they will be played out.
India's decision to introduce a product patent regime into its laws in 1970, on the back of the Justice Ayyangar Committee Report, 182 was a reformative measure, as it was in response to internal factors, i.e. the socio-economic conditions then prevailing in the country. This measure not only helped India in achieving a greater degree of self-sufficiency in access to medicines through generics drug manufacturing, but also was to help other developing countries in the fight against HIV/AIDS in the years to follow. In sharp contrast, the introduction of the product patent system in 2005 can only be seen as a response to external factors, i.e. TRIPS compliance, and can become counterproductive to India's interests and that of other developing countries who rely on it for generic drugs supply, if not administered properly. The problems identified in the Justice Ayyangar Committee report, especially on access to medicines, have not been fully addressed and the reasons for the introduction of process patent in the 1970s have not been fully realized, but India, nevertheless has moved towards a new patent law regime. This transformation in India will be felt around the globe, 183 and it will have to be seen how India endeavours to maintain its stance in the face of stiff challenges from developed countries and multinational pharmaceutical patent holders.
179 UNAIDS (n 155). 180 Chaudhuri (n 139). The author is critical of the trend prevalent in developed nations like the USA where in the name of innovation 'mindless patenting' takes place much against the interest of the consumer. This model in his view is followed by a number of developing countries either willingly or unwillingly. 181 Ibid. 182 A Report on the Revision of the Law in India Relating to Patents for Inventions (n 16). 183 Mueller (n 4).
